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Abstract 
 
In the inherently anarchic international system the validity of moral principles is weakening. 
To overcome anarchy global governance is needed. It means efficient international 
institutions, but also pressures from the global civil society and the self-regulation of business. 
Multinational firms have the duty of cooperating in governance systems. They also have the 
duty of reconciling in their activity the two, equally legitimate claims of universalism and 
cultural relativism; i.e., applying universal moral principles and respecting local moral norms. 
Finally, multinationals must be guided by the principle of enhanced responsibility. However, 
although globalizing efforts are important in overcoming international anarchy and 
coordinating the protection of global commons, strong arguments support the notion that 
economic globalization does not promote sustainable development. Some form of localization 
of the economy is certainly needed. The challenge is to find a way towards more global 
governance with less economic globalization. 
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12.1 The Challenge of Globalization 
 
Ours is the age of economic globalization. Although a glimpse of globalization had already 
appeared at the end of the nineteenth century, current trends differ considerably from past 
ones. The “globalization” of the nineteenth century was marked by strong movements of 
capital, labor and goods within the “world economy” of that time, which  included only 
discreet portions of the globe. However, today’s globalization is characterized by an 
unprecedented degree of free and fast movement of capital around the whole globe, and by 
the global institutions of a financial superstructure. Capital has acquired predominance over 
other factors of production. Economic activities are coordinated by globally integrated 
financial and capital markets. 
 In his famous essay, Karl Polanyi (1946) describes the advent of capitalism in 
nineteenth century Britain as “The Great Transformation..” This was the process through 
which the logic of the market not only transformed a multitude of economic activities, 
creating the “market economy,” but also changed the nature of social institutions, thereby 
shaping a “market society.” Polanyi’s thesis is that a “market economy” necessitates a 
“market society,” where social interactions and activities like labor, and even human, 
relations, the cultivation of land, the management of natural resources, and even the evolution 
of culture, are coordinated by the logic of the market. He argues that the social and 
environmental consequences of this process are dramatic, because a single logic rules over all 
others. And there is no one logic which is able to effectively coordinate all the complex and 
diverse interactions of the social and natural world. We need diversity and  a plurality of 
coordination schemes: market forces must be countervailed by state regulation, the control of 
civil society and the self-regulation of business. 
 In a similar vein, we can argue that a “Great Transformation” is currently taking place 
on a global scale. The dominant development paradigm - preached by the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization and global business 
organizations -  advises countries to liberalize international trade, assist foreign investors, and 
privatize national assets;  and to cut back government expenditures, including assistance to 
small farmers and spending on health, education and environmental protection. The global 
economic crisis that started in 2008 first seemed to change the predominance of the market 
dogma, and provoked some soul searching among eminent figures of neoliberalism – like 
Alan Greenspan, former president of the FED who admitted that he had to much faith in the 
market logic. But despite those quick reactions, in fact, paradigmatic change has not occurred 
in economic policies. The neoliberal arrogance has been tempered to some extent, but 
economic difficulties and roaring public debts brought back the well known arguments for 
austerity measures: less government expenditures, more private initiatives. 
Thus, despite some drawbacks, the advanture of globalization continues. Economies 
all around the world are being reshaped under the pressure of global markets: “market 
economy” is being created on a global scale. And this has fundamental social and 
environmental consequences as well. There is evidence that national economic policies based 
on liberalization benefit international business,  multinational companies and global financial 
markets. However, their effects on people, local cultures and the environment are more than 
dubious. 
 Where are the countervailing forces to market interests on the global level? Are the 
already existing institutions (like international treaties and organizations) of global 
governance strong enough to create and protect the needed balance between variegated values 
and interests? What kind of regulation and governance do we need? This problematic, as we 
will see, is a reformulation of a very old one in international ethics. 
  
 However, the need for global governance raises a very fundamental ethical question 
about the basic values of global cooperation. The problematic of universalism versus 
relativism will be explored in connection with the ethics of multinational companies, because 
any examination of international business ethics should deal with the problems involving both 
the systemic and corporate levels. Besides analyzing the conditions and possibilities of global 
governance, the rules of the global game, we should not forget about the responsibility of 
individual companies when trying to resolve the ethical dilemmas of the international 
marketplace.  
 
12.2 The Ethics of International Business 
 
12.2.1. The problem of regulation: order and disorder 
 
The oldest tradition of international ethics is moral scepticism. A well-known formulation of 
this view is given by the seventeenth century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes. He argues 
in his Leviathan that the international system is inherently anarchic, lacking any central, 
order-enforcing authority, and this justifies actors (states) in defending their interests by any 
means they judge appropriate. That is, ethical considerations lose their validity in anarchy. 
According to Hobbes, the phenomenon of inter-state relations resembles the original state of 
nature, prior to the creation of society and the state. In the original state of nature, individuals 
would attack one another simply out of the natural fear that others posed a threat to their 
safety. They lived in constant fear and insecurity and therefore benefited greatly from 
contracting with a sovereign power that would enforce rights and duties. However, 
cooperation between states is much less compelling and fruitful than cooperation between 
individuals, therefore the formation of a supranational sovereignty never becomes imperative. 
Anarchy will remain a basic feature of international relations, even if it does not necessarily 
imply constant hostility between states. But even peacetimes are shaped by power relations 
and strategic considerations. 
 However, is the international system really as desperately anarchic as the Hobbesian 
arguments suggest?  Regulatory efforts are a constant presence and international law has 
evolved considerably in the past centuries. Thousands of international treaties and hundreds of 
international organizations are designed to secure the terms of international cooperation.  
 Nevertheless, Castells (1997) still speaks about „global disorder.” He argues that while 
during the twentieth century states made considerable efforts to reduce anarchy through the 
creation of global institutions (like the United Nations) and the development of international 
law, the appearance, and the growing power, of international organizations in the international 
arena undermine their legitimacy. These international organizations, which include 
multinational companies, non-governmental organizations (like Amnesty International and 
Greenpeace), and even government-founded institutions, like the International Monetary 
Fund, have become a major force in the international arena. Although their performance in 
attracting resources and managing issues is rather remarkable, their activity puts into question 
the sovereignty and the intervening  capabilities of states. Nowadays many interests and 
values are represented by many agents in the international arena. Greenpeace tries to 
influence governments, business and the people in the name of environmental values; 
multinational companies promote their own interests, and so on. In this situation a state 
becomes just one kind of actor in a cast of many - and not even the most powerful one, 
necessarily. 
  
 In sum, although talking about anarchy in the context of international relations seems 
like an overstatement, the fact is that there are no political mechanisms on a global scale to 
channel and represent the different interests, and the legitimacy of international organizations 
might be problematic. In this „global disorder,” the pursuit of self-interests and strategic 
behavior might seem to be the most rational strategy for the actors, be they states, companies 
or international organizations. For instance, states are reluctant to cooperate on managing the 
global commons, because these issues require considerable resources with uncertain returns. 
This is the „tragedy of global commons” (see Box 12.1). 
 
 
  
Box 12.1 The „tragedy of global commons.” The case of climate policies.   
 
Climate change has been an increasing concern across the world for more than ten years 
already. In order to prevent its dramatic consequences, concerted global actions are urgently 
needed.  In 1997, a number of countries, including most OECD countries, agreed on the 
provisions adopted by the Kyoto Protocol, which sets targets for future emissions of 
greenhouse gases that drive climate change. But the Kyoto Protocol left many decisions to be 
made, and while these are being discussed the clock ticks and the date for meeting the targets 
draws closer. The Kyoto targets in themselves would have done little to avert climate change 
but were best seen as a first step towards more ambitious world-wide action. However, even 
these modest potential achievements were undermined, because in 2001 US President George 
W. Bush announced that his administration is dropping US support for the Kyoto Protocol, 
although the US alone is responsible for some 25 percent of all global greenhouse gas 
emissions. Bush's unilateral decision represented the interests of US oil companies, Bush's 
corporate backers. The decision has sparked outrage around the world. The UK Deputy Prime 
Minister John Prescott declared that “The US cannot sit in glorious isolation… It must know 
it cannot pollute the world while free-riding on action by everyone else.” Unfortunately, the 
US was not the only major international player acting in a rather irresponsible way in terms of 
climate policies. Several Western European countries have not been able either to reduce, let 
alone, stabilize their greenhouse gas emissions. If the EU as a whole could meet the modest 
Kyoto targets, it was only because the new Central and Eastern European member states have 
lower emissions. This fact deeply undermines the credibility of the official EU position, 
which is in favor of strict climate policy measures. Moreover, the  2009 negotiations in 
Koppenhagen turned out as a major failure partly because of a leaked European document that 
sets as political goal that rich countries should not make serious commitments, rather the 
developing countries should be convinced to reduce their emissions. However, developing 
countries, including the large ones, like China, India or Brazil, which have become important 
atmospheric polluters, reject to spend more on climate protection until they see that the rich 
countries, still the major polluters, take the lead. 
  
 
For international business, global disorder, or anarchy, means first and foremost an 
insufficient regulatory framework; and, as a consequence, good opportunities to  capitalize on 
their own self-interest (Scherer et al., 2009). We have to admit that “the usually reliable 
backdrop of national law, the local legal order which tends to ensure a minimum level of 
compliance for domestic corporations in domestic markets, is missing in the international 
scene” (Donaldson, 1989: 31). This fact sheds a different light on corporate responsibility in 
the global marketplace. 
 
 
Box 12.2. The case of corruption.   
 
Corruption has been long recognized as being sadly a typical phenomenon of international 
business. From the early 1970s, the OECD urged its member states to take actions against 
international corruption, but no binding regulation was adopted. In 1977 the United States 
passed its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (in the wake of the Lockheed bribery scandal, in 
which Lockheed officers bribed the Japanese government for a contract) which prohibited 
American corporations from offering payments to officials of foreign governments. However, 
as no other country followed the U.S. in adopting similar regulation, American companies 
began to suffer from “less ethical” competition abroad. Therefore, some years after its 
adoption the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was softened somewhat. Although no one 
questioned that corruption in international business is a serious problem, it took several 
decades for the OECD member states to finally sign an international treaty in 1997 on the 
issue. And this is still just the first step in effectively fighting corruption. Implementation is 
still weak and corruption has not been significantly reduced in international business. 
 
 
Domestic law is less effective in regulating the activities of multinational companies for a 
number of reasons. First, the empirical fact is that in developing countries regulation is less 
sophisticated and enforcement of the laws is less effective than in developed countries, which 
in turn, do not rush to impose extraterritorial regulation on their home-chartered multinational 
corporations (see reference to the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in Box 12.2). Second,  
multinational companies have some latitude in offsetting domestic regulation. For instance, 
they can easily avoid hard taxation through the strategic use of transfer prices; or they can 
make use of collisions between the norms of the home and the host country. Third, 
multinational corporations have enormous power. Some of this power is symbolic: because 
they are taken to be the dynamic force of capitalism, states compete with each other in 
attracting foreign direct investment. And if they are unsatisfied, multinationals threaten to 
leave the host country. But their power is not exclusively symbolic; sometimes it is very real. 
Comparing the annual GDP of countries and the turnover of companies, we can see that more 
than fifty out of the hundred biggest economies in the world are not countries, but companies 
(see Box 12.3). They control a large share of world markets and the overwhelming majority of 
patents. “Trade is defined in large measure by pricing determined internally by the 
multinationals, and such prices are not, properly speaking, the result of the free play of the 
market. The entrance of a new independent producer is complicated, given the economies of 
reach and scale and the preferential access to finance that the multinationals enjoy” 
(Ugarteche, 2000: 108). Finally, not only are multinationals extremely powerful, but, on top 
of this, they are backed and assisted by international financial institutions. And evidence 
shows that these companies are ready to use their power when searching the world to find the 
  
cheapest human and natural resources, and the most supportive environments for their 
business. 
 
 
Box 12.3. Comparing the annual GDP of selected countries and the revenue of some of 
the biggest companies for year 2010, in current USD billions. (Source: 
www.worldbank.org and www.fortune.com.) 
Poland 
Wal-Mart Stores 
Austria 
Argentina 
Denmark 
Greece 
Royal Dutch/Shell Group 
Exxon Mobil 
BP 
Finland  
Egypt 
Toyota Motor 
AXA 
China National Petroleum 
Romania 
General Electric 
Peru 
Tanzania 
468.6 
408.2 
376.2 
368.0 
310.4 
304.8 
285.1 
284.6 
246.1 
238.8 
218.9 
204.6 
175.2 
165.5 
161.6 
156.8 
153.8 
23.5 
 
In sum, the regulation of the multinationals based on domestic laws is imperfect. We certainly 
need international regulatory framework. Although many international institutions and treaties 
are already in place to regulate business, a number of problems still remain:  
 
(i) regulation is only slowly evolving even in those areas which are widely recognized as 
problematic (corruption, money-laundering); 
(ii) regulation tends to neglect some areas, or stakeholders. For instance, in international 
trade agreements competition is relatively well-secured, and consumer interests are also given 
some weight. But labor standards and environmental issues are largely disregarded; 
(iii) broader ethical issues are treated almost exclusively in non-binding documents, like 
codes of conduct. Although their role in regulating business is more and more important and 
should not be neglected, it is limited in many respects. They provide rather “soft” provisions; 
non-compliance, by definition, is not penalized; specific codes, focusing on particular 
problem areas, are elaborated retrospectively; that is, after a scandal or tragedy becomes 
known (see Box 12.4). 
  
 
 
Box 12.4 Codes of conduct for multinationals.   
 
One genre of codes manifests itself as specific documents, focusing on a particular problem. 
These codes typically emerge as a response to a scandal or tragic accident. They include 
intergovernmental documents (like the European Economic Community’s Code of Conduct 
for Companies with Interest in South Africa, 1977), codes elaborated under the auspices of an 
international organization (like the World Health Organization’s Code on the Marketing of 
Breast-milk Substitutes, 1981), and guidelines and standards developed by business 
organizations (like the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Associations’ code of pharmaceutical marketing practice, 1981).  
 
Another class of codes is engendered by comprehensive charters which cover several problem 
areas. Some of these have been elaborated by civil and business organizations (like the Social 
Accountability 8000 standard, or the charter of the GoodCorporation), and we can delineate 
here those intergovernmental compacts which aim at defining the basic outlines of the global 
corporate ethic. Their normative force is based on widely accepted moral values, norms and 
the provisions of other basic international documents, like the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. The most important such comprehensive compacts are: the OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Entreprises (accepted in 1976; last amended in 2011); the International 
Labor Office (ILO) Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Entreprises 
and Social Policy (1977); the United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations 
(Not completed); the Ten Principles of the United Nations’ Global Compact (2000 and 2004).  
Some of the problem areas covered in, and normative guides offered by, these compacts are 
(see Frederick, 1991): Employment Practices and Policies - multinationals should respect the 
right of employees to join trade unions and bargain collectively. (ILO, OECD, UN Global 
Compact);  multinationals should develop nondiscriminatory employment policies and 
promote equal job opportunities. (ILO, OECD, UN Global Compact); multinationals should, 
minimally, pay basic living wages to empoyees (ILO); Consumer Protection - multinationals 
should safeguard the health and safety of consumers by various disclosures, safe packaging, 
proper labeling, and accurate advertising (UN Code); Environmental Protection - 
multinationals should disclose environmental information and minimize environmental risks 
and harms (OECD, UN Code); multinationals should promote the development of 
international environmental standards (UN Code); Political Payments and Involvement - 
multinationals should not pay bribes nor make improper payments to public officials and 
should avoid improper or illegal involvement or interference in the internal politics of host 
nations (OECD, UN). 
 
 
When talking about the regulation of international business, George Soros stated that “the 
current state of affairs is unsound and unsustainable” (Soros, 1998: xx). He was, of course, 
talking about the regulation of financial markets, where the situation is even more dramatic, 
as proven by the global financial and economic crisis started in 2008. This reality calls for a 
system of international regulations unthinkable before now. 
 But even if we leave the world of global finance behind us in order to turn back to the 
problem of regulating the multinationals, we can argue that Soros’ statement still holds. It is 
widely recognized that more regulation is needed. But this time regulation should move away 
from the “free-trade paradigm,” which means that the focus of the regulation is on securing 
fair competition, the enforcement of the non-discri
  
state intervention in business. The 1997 debate about the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (see Box 12.5) and the developments under the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) under the auspices of the World Trade Organization showed that even now 
many think that this paradigm is a relevant frame of reference for regulating not only trade, 
but international business in general. However, debates around the MAI and the GATS also 
revealed that for many people this paradigm is outdated and no longer acceptable. Not only 
should international business and investments not be regulated in a trade-like manner, but 
even trade rules should change in order to encompass broader (i.e., social and environmental) 
concerns. The free-trade paradigm was perhaps an appropriate one in the 20th century as a 
reaction to the chaotic state of trade before World War II, brought on by the Great 
Depression, which took the forms of high tariff barriers, extensive use of nontariff barriers to 
trade, widespread trade discrimination, and, as a consequence, a severely  reduced volume of 
international trade and investment. But nowadays, under the conditions of economic 
globalization, the goal of the international regulation of business should move away from 
focusing solely on the terms of competition. It should be redesigned in order to be able to 
protect and promote the basic rights and the welfare of people around the world, and to 
preserve and sustain the natural ecosystems. 
 
 
 
 
Box 12.5. The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI).   
 
The secret negotiations on the MAI began in 1995 under the auspices of the OECD. It was 
conceived as a “technical agreement,” but it turned out to be more of a “constitution for the 
global economy.” However, it was a very flawed constitution, because it laid down the rights 
of international business without outlining its obligations. When in 1997 the text of the MAI 
became public it caused world-wide indignation. The MAI was deemed unacceptable by 
NGOs, political organizations and even the European Parliament. Its provisions would have 
prohibited discrimination of any kind against multinationals, while allowing for preferential 
treatment. Corporations would have had unprecedent freedom to sue governments, and in case 
of dispute, they would have had the possibility to “opt out” from the jurisdiction of the state in 
question and ask the judgment of an international dispute-settlement panel. 
However, some MAI-like provisions found their ways into international treaties. The North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) also allows companies to sue states if their profit 
is being affected by government policies, even social or environmental ones. The GATS 
agreement has also provoked vivid controversies, mainly on its possible effects on public 
services. Major European cities, including Paris, Oxford and Florence, joined a “Stop GATS” 
campaign protesting against the treaty (see www.gatswatch.org). 
 
  
 
Regulation does not mean solely formalization and institutionalization. In the era of “global 
turbulence” (Rosenau, 1990) the global civil society is increasingly able and ready to 
contribute to the effectiveness of global governance. Informal pressures coming from NGOs, 
or even the media, are now part of the evolution of international regimes (governance 
systems). These agents voice moral claims which are difficult to neglect. International NGOs 
(like Amnesty International or Greenpeace) or even those formal institutions which otherwise 
do not have real power (e.g., the International Labour Organisation), can have influence just 
by pointing out the problems. Thus, a “discursive multilateralism” is also part of the global 
regulatory setting (Weisband, 2000). 
 Let’s suppose that international regulatory efforts of all kinds will intensify in the 
coming years! (It is actually not a counterfactual hypothesis: in the past 20 years more than 
200 international treaties were signed in the field of environmental protection alone; and 
many of them affect business.) Still, anarchy as a basic feature of the international system will 
remain at least for a while. What should multinationals do under these conditions? Some 
argue that under imperfect regulation, when there is no guarantee that  others will follow the 
norms, they have only limited responsibility and should therefore primarily follow their own 
self-interest. In a similar spirit, „Boddewyn and Brewer (1994) have defended the view that 
managers should consider the host-country government on a par with other competitive 
factors. For his own part, Boddewyn (1986) has even argued that when companies seek 
competitive advantage, bribery, smuggling, and buying absolute market monopolies are not 
necessarily ruled out” (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999: 220). These recommendations are 
perfectly in line with Hobbesian moral scepticism. 
 However, acknowledging international anarchy must not lead to moral scepticism. 
Immanuel Kant, in his Eternal Peace, argues that moral law obliges us to follow ethical 
norms in international affairs even if nobody else is following them, and we must promote 
peace among nations even if it seems hopeless. But in order to secure peace and promote 
compliance with the norms, he proposes reducing anarchy through international cooperation 
and institution building. That is, while Hobbes thought that cooperation is difficult under the 
conditions of anarchy, Kant argues that we need cooperation, just because of the existing 
anarchy. In a similar spirit, if one thinks that it is difficult to put high moral claims on the 
multinationals under the conditions of imperfect regulation, we should reply that ethics is not 
conditional: basic duties do not vanish just because some do not follow them.  Multinationals 
cannot justify unethical behavior with a simple reference to the circumstances. Moreover, an 
additional duty is incumbent upon them: that of cooperating somehow in global governance 
in order to contribute to reducing anarchy. 
 
12.2.2  An ethics for the multinationals 
 
Let’s move towards the ethics of the corporation! Although the context and the quality of the 
regulatory framework of a behavior is very important in influencing its ethicality, we should 
not forget that agents always have some autonomy, and therefore some responsibility in 
deciding what to do. That is, as stated above, international anarchy does not discard the 
responsibility of the multinational to act in an ethical way. On the contrary: the enormous 
power of the multinational increases its responsibility in dealing with the stakeholders. In this 
section we will shortly overview the ethics of the multinational company. 
 Both international ethicists and business ethicists (e.g., Donaldson, 1989, 1993, 
Walzer, 1994, Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999) argue that the main problem we face when 
trying to specify the universally binding obligations for multinationals is the difference in 
moral standards between the cultures. In very practical terms this means that the host-country 
  
standards, norms or values might differ from the multinational’s home-country standards, 
norms and values. What to do in the case of conflicting norms? This simple question has a 
broader relevance. The empirical fact that many moral cultures coexist in the world might 
cause problems for international ethics. Although we tend to believe that there are universally 
valid norms and values, we also do cherish cultural diversity and argue that local communities 
should be recognized and respected. That is, at one extreme, the position of universalism 
implies that there exists a set of universally binding norms which rules out the possibility of 
two conflicting ethical views in different cultures being equally valid. At the other extreme, 
the position of cultural relativism implies that “no ethical view held by one culture is better 
than any other view held by another culture” (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999: 23). 
Universalism is sometimes accused of implying moral imperialism and arrogant absolutism. 
Relativism, taken to the extreme, means that we should accept any cultural norm, no matter 
how inhumane, or how bizarre it is. 
 How to find a balance between universalism and relativism? Donaldson and Dunfee 
argue for pluralism defined as follows: “There exists a broad range of ethical view-points that 
may be chosen by communities and cultures. The possibility exists that conflicting ethical 
positions in different cultures are equally valid. There are, however, circumstances in which 
the viewpoint of a particular culture will be invalid due either to a universally binding moral 
precept or to the priority of the view of another culture or community” (Donaldson and 
Dunfee, 1999: 23). That is, pluralism is a moderate universalistic position, complemented by 
the value of tolerance. 
 In a strict philosophical sense it might be difficult to reconcile the two equally 
important and legitimate claims of universalism and relativism. But in practice, in the spirit of 
pluralism, we can and must find practical solutions to overcome the problem. 
 Donaldson (1989) proposes a practical tool to solve ethical dilemmas related to 
universalism and relativism. First, he defines the minimal moral duties of multinationals in 
terms of fundamental human rights following three conditions: 1) the right must protect 
something of very great importance; 2) the right must be subject to substantial and recurrent 
threats; and 3) the obligations or burdens imposed by the right must satisfy a fairness-
affordability test; that is, all kinds of actors in the international scene should able to afford the 
costs of respecting the right in question. 
 Donaldson’s list of fundamental human rights generated from these conditions 
include: 1) the right to freedom of physical movement; 2) the right to ownership of property; 
3) the right to freedom from torture; 4) the right to a fair trial; 5) the right to 
nondiscriminatory treatment (e.g., freedom from discrimination on the basis of such 
characteristics as race or sex); 6) the right to physical security; 7) the right to freedom of 
speech and association; 8) the right to minimal education; 9) the right to political 
participation; and 10) the right to subsistence (Donaldson, 1989: 81). These rights must be 
honored by all actors in the international scene. 
 Second, he elaborates an “ethical algorithm” in order to help the decision-maker (the 
multinational manager) in those more subtle situations where the conflict of norms cannot be 
resolved with a simple reference to fundamental rights. Donaldson argues that there are two 
basic cases: “If the practice is morally and/or legally permitted in the host country, then 
either: 1) the moral reasons underlying the host country's view that the practice is permissible 
refer to the host country's relative level of economic development; or 2) the moral reasons 
underlying the host country's view that the practice is permissible are independent of the host 
country's relative level of economic development” (Donaldson, 1989: 102). The first case 
refers to such things as labor standards, environmental regulation, and so on. Donaldson 
assumes that these standards evolve with economic development. The second case refers to 
genuine cultural norms, customs and habits. 
  
 In the first case, the “ethical algorithm” offers the following formula: “The practice is 
permissible for the multinational if and only if the members of the home country would, under 
conditions of economic development similar to those of the host country, regard the practice 
as permissible” (Donaldson, 1989: 103). The rule allows for some relativism. For instance, the 
multinational is not obliged to apply the home country’s strict environmental protection 
standards, unless required by law, in an African country. Not because high standards are not 
desirable per se, but because the level of development requires a commensurate ordering of 
priorities. However, the rule certainly does not allow the release of highly toxic pollutants; 
that is, the rule’s relativism is limited in scope. 
 In the second case, the decision-maker must ask the following questions: 1) Is it 
possible to conduct business successfully in the host country without undertaking the 
practice? and 2) Is the practice a clear violation of a fundamental international right? The 
practice would be permissible if and only if the answer to both questions is “no” (Donaldson, 
1989: 104). That is, the multinational should avoid conforming to questionable local practices, 
but if it is not possible, and the practice in case is a clear violation of human rights, the 
company should consider even disinvesting from the country, as some multinationals did in 
the 1980s from South Africa, because of the Apartheid regime which was institutionalizing 
racial discrimination. 
 Donaldson’s “ethical algorithm” is an original attempt to deal with conflicting norms 
and reconcile universalism and relativism. As a practical tool, it is, of course, simplifying 
things to a large extent. It is, for instance, legitimate to question whether we can compare the 
development levels of different countries, as suggested in decision rule 1. Nevertheless, the 
distinction between welfare norms (dependent on the level of development) and authentic 
cultural norms is an important one. In the case of welfare norms there is some place for 
“quantitative adjustments,” and although we want multinationals to apply higher norms if the 
local ones are too permissive (for instance, in some developing countries it is allowed to pay 
wages under the subsistence level, and sometimes environmental regulation is highly 
ineffective), it would be unfair to oblige them to apply the same standards everywhere. 
Authentic cultural norms are more difficult to adjust: in most of the cases one should either 
accept or reject them. For instance, gender discrimination seems to be an integral part of the 
culture of many Muslim countries, and companies are forced to either follow this norm in 
their operations or leave the country in question. 
 Donaldson and Dunfee (1999) offer a different approach to deal with universalism and 
relativism. They abandon Donaldson’s original idea about a well-defined list of rights (as 
minimal duties) and the “ethical algorithm.” Nevertheless, their Integrated Social Contract 
Theory (ISCT) is still about the problem of how to put into practice the concept of pluralism. 
The structure of their model is similar to Donaldson's (1989), but less prescriptive. They also 
assume the existence of some universal principles, what they call hypernorms. These are key 
limits on the “moral free space” of the actors, and serve as ultimate points of reference in case 
of ethical conflicts. However, unlike Donaldson (1989), they avoid defining a limited list of 
hypernorms. Instead, they hold that hypernorms are constantly evolving, and in order to 
decide whether a principle constitutes a hypernorm, decision-makers should look for 
evidences: such as whether there is widespread consensus that the norm is universal, 
supported by the laws of many different countries, known to be consistent with the precepts of 
major religions and philosophies, supported by prominent NGOs or international business 
organizations, and so on. Hypernorms include basic ethical values (like human dignity), 
norms (like promise keeping), human rights, and welfare norms (like the prohibition of child 
labor). 
 However, agents have considerable moral free space as well. “Moral free space is the 
area bounded by hypernorms in which communities develop ethical norms representing a 
  
collective viewpoint concerning right behavior” (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999: 83). That is, 
under the umbrella of the “macrosocial contract” based on hypernorms, communities (which 
include local communities, professional organizations, business organizations, and so on) may 
generate ethical norms for their members through “microsocial” contracts. 
 Now, What if a multinational observes a conflict between, let’s say, local norms and 
the provisions of the company’s own code of conduct?  First, norms must be screened for 
legitimacy under hypernorm tests. A norm is illegitimate if it clearly contradicts some 
hypernorms (like basic human rights), or if it is not an authentic community norm (e.g., it was 
forced on the community). Second, remaining legitimate norms should be screened for 
dominance. However, Donaldson and Dunfee do not elaborate an “ethical algorithm” to deal 
with this problem; they just propose some “rules of thumb” which might help. Relevant 
factors might include priority rules already adopted as norms between communities; potential 
externalities; and essentialness of the norms to the transaction environment. If a clear 
dominant norm emerges, ethical judgment should be based on it; if there is no clear dominant 
norm, ethical judgment can be based on any legitimate norm (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999: 
206). 
 It is strange that neither Donaldson’s (1989) nor Donaldson and Dunfee’s (1999) 
procedures include the principle of dialogue and communication (see, e.g., Gilbert and 
Rasche, 2007). This principle is formulated by discourse ethics. According to Karl-Otto Apel 
(1990), discourse ethics implies that only those norms that meet (or could be reasonably 
presumed to meet) with the approval of all concerned in a real, rational debate can claim to be 
valid. The debate should be as close as possible to the “ideal communication situation” which 
is free of domination and argumentative inequality, and in which participants do not act in a 
strategic way but perform a real communicative action. Whereas in strategic action one actor 
seeks to influence the behavior of another by means of threatening sanctions or offering 
carrots, in communicative action one actor seeks to motivate another rationally by relying on 
the persuasive power of the arguments (Habermas, 1990: 63). Ideally, the validity of speech 
lies in its intelligibility (valid meaning), truthfulness (subjective authenticity), factual truth 
and correctness (normative justifiability).  The principle implies that the multinational should 
enter into fair negotiations with the stakeholders if a conflict arises between, for instance, the 
home-country and the host-country norms. However, if openness to the dialogue is an 
undeniably important value, it is also true that cultural differences are sometimes difficult to 
overcome through discussion, and negotiations might become endless.  
 A concluding problem related to the ethics of multinationals should be mentioned. 
Their operations in a social, cultural and natural environment, that frequently differs markedly 
from their own, can lead to unforseen and sometimes dramatic consequences. The Nestlé case 
sadly illustrates the point: Who would have imagined that a “simple” advertising campaign 
might lead to human tragedies, the death of babies? Many similar cases prove that 
multinationals should design their policies and operations  with greater prudence. Water 
pollution has different effects in a rich country than in the rural area of a poor country where 
people get their drinking water from a river; logging has different consequences in a highly 
sensitive tropical area than in a temperate zone forest; consumerist marketing campaigns 
might have brutal cultural effects in a traditionalist society; workers in a developing country 
might be less aware of the health and environmental risks of modern industrial technologies; 
and so on. All this entails the enhanced responsibility of doing business abroad. 
Unfortunately, reality often conflicts sharply with this ideal (see the Bhopal case. 
 
In summary, the ethics of the multinational companies is built of the following elements: 
 
  
Openness to dialogue and cooperation (in the spirit of Kantian and discourse ethics). This 
means both cooperating in terms of global governance and being open to the voices of 
different cultural communities and stakeholders. 
 
Respecting some basic universal values and norms (like the norm of „Do no harm!” or human 
rights, or the provisions of codes of conducts). Some flexibility, however, might be 
unavoidable when applying the universal norms. But there are also cases when firms should 
disinvest from the country,  particularly if basic norms are systematically violated and there is 
no hope that „enlightened” business can improve the situation. 
 
Respecting the norms of different communities -  even this might imply some  adjustments, 
because the norms of different relevant communities (typically the home and the host 
countries) may require different approaches. A useful distinction between the norms concerns 
their underlying moral context: whether or not the norm in question is related to the relative 
level of development of the countries. A rule of thumb might be that if the local norm is 
independent of the level of development (i.e., if it is an authentic cultural norm) then it should 
be respected; but in case of norms that are dependent on the developmental level of the host 
country (e.g., labor, environmental, or health standards) firms should be required to apply 
somewhat higher (either universal, or home country) norms, if the local ones are too 
permissive. 
 
An enhanced responsibility of the firm abroad. In an unknown social, economic, cultural and 
ecological environment, even those business practices which otherwise might be seen as 
„innocent” can have dramatic consequences. Firms must be particularly careful when 
designing their policies and actions abroad. 
 
 
12.3   Globalization vs. localization 
 
Globalization critics (D.C. Korten, 1995, Hines, 2000) argue that the inherent features of 
today’s globalized economy make sustainable development impossible, both from a human 
and an ecological point of view.  
 Globalization leads to increased social inequalities. Empirical studies and historical 
examples show that in export-oriented economies, ceteris paribus, social inequalities are 
growing (Giraud, 1996, Gowdy, 1995, Rodrik, 1997, Wade, 2004). The revenue of those who 
are “internationally competitive” will depend on international markets and can have a much 
higher growth rate than the revenue of those who are producing for the local market. Only 
effective government policies can prevent growing inequalities. However, the idea of a strong 
government is against the ruling development paradigm, defended by the IMF and the World 
Bank. The fact is that social inequalities have sharply increased in the past 20 years all over 
the world, including the OECD countries.  
 Globalization means sharp competition and a “race to the bottom” in terms of social 
and environmental regulation. For instance, in Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s export processing 
zones even these countries’ own - not too demanding - labor rights are suspended; Brazil has 
several times relaxed its environmental regulation during the 1990s. The erosion of wages, 
welfare standards and environmental regulations reinforces the effect of trade on social 
inequalities, because any reduction of government welfare spending affects first and foremost 
the poor.  
 Globalization means cultural homogenization and loss of cultural identities. A 
“consumer monoculture” (Hines, 2000: 4) is being imposed everywhere, which has 
  
unpleasant economic as well as ecological consequences. The former manifests itself in the 
growing imports of expensive consumer goods in relatively poor countries, the latter means 
the spread of unsustainable consumption patterns. And the cultural challenge of globalization 
leads to emerging identity-based social movements and cultural conflicts (see Castells, 1997). 
The rising wave of religious fundamentalism in Islamic countries illustrates the point. 
 Globalization means shifting power from political communities to business. This, 
together with identity crises and growing inequalities, leads to a fragmentation of political 
communities, loss of solidarity inside the society, growing apathy, decreased political activity 
and/or an increase in the power of radical political movements.  
 Globalization leads to ecological homogenization. Export-oriented agriculture is based 
on the extensive use of a few cash crop varieties, which means the crowding out of local 
varieties (Noorgard, 1988). For instance, according to estimations, thousands of rice varieties 
have already disappeared in India during the last few decades due to agro-business trends 
(Johnston, 1995). This has dramatic social, cultural and ecological consequences. Shiva et al. 
(1991) argue that with vanishing local production local traditions are disappearing as well; 
that is, the ongoing homogenization in agriculture represents a double (cultural and 
ecological) loss.  
 International trade leads to the overuse of resources. This is called the growth effect of 
trade (Pearce, 1994). If a local product becomes popular, local production might face the 
burden of a global demand. The growth effect of trade might have a dramatic effect on eco-
systems and environmental resources. For instance, there is no way to satisfy the global 
demand for leopard fur; the only way to save leopards from excessive hunting is to ban fur 
trade all together. The global demand for shrimps caused the extension of shrimp production 
in South East Asia which led to the clearing of precious mangrove forests (Ekins et al., 1994: 
8).  
 And, finally, the structural features of the global economy and the huge organizations 
involved make impossible the application of the precautionary principle. The psychological 
phenomenon of discounting in space and time impedes the application of responsibility on a 
global scale: people are unable to make responsible decisions about remote issues. Therefore, 
“localizing” the economy is a necessary, though insufficient, condition of sustainable 
development (Gowdy, 1995, Curtis, 2003). 
 In sum, globalization implies an unjust world system and an unsound, unsustainable 
development concept. Some of these shortcomings might be corrected through more efficient 
global governance. For instance, labor and environmental standards might be regulated on a 
global scale (Giscard d’Estaing, 1995). However, some structural features of a globalizing 
economy seem impossible to reform. Therefore, globalization should not only be more 
regulated, but also restricted; we need some kind of localization instead of more globalization. 
 Localization has several meanings. It might mean just some “slowing down” of the 
global economy and a reformulation of the mission of global economic institutions (like the 
IMF). For instance, some form of a “Tobin tax” would slow down the flow of money in 
international financial markets, reducing speculative international financial movements, and, 
by this, the risk of financial crisis. “A 0.5 percent tax should be collected on all spot 
transactions in foreign exchange, including foreign exchange deliveries pursuant to futures 
contracts and options” (Korten, 1995: 321). International agreement should not promote the 
interests of multinationals and international finance, but they should empower local 
communities to control and manage local resources for local benefits. For instance, 
preferential treatment of foreign investors would be prohibited; multinationals would be 
required to stay longer in a given country, to make longer term commitments in their 
investment decisions. And so on. 
  
 But localization in a more radical sense means a clear-cut restructuring of the economy 
towards local functioning  (Doughwait, 1996, J. Robertson, 1998, Hines, 2000, Curtis, 2003). 
This means localizing the capital and the money through community investment, community 
banking and local money creation, and localizing food security and sustainable development 
through local production of organic food. It also means localizing production through taxation 
and creating competition policies that benefit and protect local markets, shopkeepers and 
small business. In such a world, the economy would not revolve around the logic of trade and 
international investments, but just the opposite. Trade of goods and the international 
movement of money would be seen as mere complements, with stress given to the rebuilding 
of local economies worldwide. 
 
12.4 The Case of the Forest and the Marine Stewardship Councils 
 
Civil society organizations (CSOs) have gained importance in public life. They increasingly 
influence politics, regulation of business, and the provision of social services. CSOs are 
increasingly turning also towards business (Boda, 2010, Boda – O’Higgins – Schedler, 2009, 
den Hond and Bakker, 2007). This approach is largely explained by the power shift that 
occurred from governments to companies, as CSOs discover that it might be easier and more 
fruitful to approach businesses with their criticisms and demands (Newell, 2000). For 
instance, the traditional way for an advocacy group to change business practices is to lobby 
the government for a new regulation. However, it may turn out that approaching companies 
themselves could be a much simpler and more successful strategy (Harrison et al., 2005). The 
ethical consumerism movement is a powerful representation of this approach; boycotts, media 
campaigns, and similar means are perceived as a real threat by companies. At the same time, 
other CSOs aim at developing cooperative relations with companies, partly because they need 
businesses’ resources (money, knowledge) in order to operate effectively. 
Values-driven, company-focused CSOs are also very active in the field of global 
business regulation. A growing literature about “private authorities” (Hall and Biersteket, 
2002, Haufler, 2001), “governance structures and international regimes” (Petschow – Rosenau 
– Weizsäcker, 2005, Bernstein – Cashore, 2007), “partnerships” (Bendell, 2000), “global 
business regulation” (Braithwaite – Drahos, 2000) suggests that globalization is not void of 
multifaceted regulatory efforts which come from different sectors. Besides international 
organizations, business and CSOs are also active in setting and promoting norms. 
 An interesting inititative is the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). Formally, FSC is an 
independent, non-governmental, not for profit organization established to promote the 
responsible management of the world’s forests. Originally it was initiated by the World Wide 
Fund for Nature (WWF), and has been created through a “bottom up” approach, and 
inclusion: the most important stakeholders, companies and NGOs, have been invited to join 
the FSC and its activity has been based on the deliberation and cooperation of the parties. 
 It was established in 1993 by a group of timber users, traders and representatives of 
environmental and human-rights organizations. This varied group of people had in common 
that all had identified the need for a system that could credibly identify well-managed forests 
as source of responsibly produced forest products. Since its inception many different 
stakeholders around the world have worked with the FSC in its equitable participatory 
processes in support of responsible forest management. However, also since its early days, 
FSC was often criticized by conservative industries which did not believe in sharing decision-
making with social and environmental stakeholders. Much like conservative industries, some 
environmental stakeholders believe that confrontational campaigns are a more appropriate 
  
conservation tool than equitable participatory solutions-oriented approaches. FSC believes 
that it is part of the solution for the conservation of natural forests and that a full set of 
different complementary conservation strategies are necessary to protect and maintain the 
world’s forests. FSC now provides standard setting, trademark insurance and accreditation 
services for companies and organizations interested in responsible forestry. Products carrying 
the FSC label are independently certified to assure consumers that they come from forests that 
are managed to meet the social, economic and ecological needs of present and future 
generations. FSC has offices in more than 45 countries. As of August 2011 the total certified 
forest area attained 140, 502, 262 ha in a total of 79 countries. 
FSC is generally recognized as a success story, and part of the success is its inclusive 
nature: stakeholders were directly involved in determining key principles and organizational 
concepts for the FSC. An interesting comparison is with the Marine Stewardship Council, 
another venture of the WWF, seeking to promote sustainable fishing practices (see Fowler 
and Heap, 2000). Both the FSC and the MSC are joint ventures of companies and NGOs to 
promote a market-led solution to environmental problems. Both of them involve the 
development by an independent council of principles and criteria for certification and eco-
labeling.  
 Where the MSC differs from the FSC is in terms of the process of consultation to 
establish the Council and to determine its governance structure. In the case of the FSC, 
stakeholders were directly involved in determining key principles and organizational concepts 
for the FSC. In contrast, although the governance structure of the MSC stresses the 
importance of inclusivity, the origin of the MSC was the partnership between WWF and 
Unilever and the structure of the MSC was proposed by the founding partners, after taking 
advice from the consulting firm Coopers and Lybrand. This was partly in response to the 
experience of the past process to establish the FSC which was found expensive and time-
consuming. There was a perceived trade-off by WWF and Unilever between undertaking 
lengthy consultations with all stakeholders and making a more substantial and timely impact 
on the industry. This contrast in the levels and processes of stakeholder participation is not 
restricted to the consultation process but also applies to the governance structure of the 
different organizations. 
 However, it turned out that the development of the MSC has been even slower than 
that of the FSC. It is probable that the limited participation was at the root of the problem that 
the MSC was clearly lagging behind the FSC in term of efficacy. But this must not be the only 
reason. One could argue, for instance, that deforestation has been solidly established as a 
major environmental problem to which people are generally sensitive, while the problem of 
overfishing has not got so much attention in public discourse. Therefore companies in the 
forestry industry are more vigilant of the public opinion and of their image than fishing 
companies. 
Nevertheless, statements from the representatives of the MSC suggest that they were 
fully aware of the need for a sense of ownership of the initiative by the stakeholders. Over the 
years the MSC has made considerable effort to increase accountability, and to provide a 
balanced participation to the stakeholders.  
 In the past couple of years the development of MSC speeded up. As of November 
2010, there are over 1,900 seafood products available with the MSC eco-label, sold in 40 
countries around the world. 38 fisheries have been independently certified as meeting the 
MSC’s environmental standard for sustainable fishing and over 80 are currently undergoing 
assessment. Over 800 companies have met the MSC Chain of Custody standard for seafood 
traceability. 
 
 
  
 
12.5 Conclusions 
 
Many argue that the solution to the global problems of our age - world poverty, inequalities, 
the destruction of the commons, and so on - is more globalization: more efficient international 
institutions; a global ethic, including international solidarity; and a more integrated global 
economy. That is, although it is undeniably part of the problem, globalization might also be 
part of the solution. 
 Nevertheless, it is obvious that globalization in its present form is not sustainable. 
Globalizing tendencies have long been accompanied by political, cultural and religious 
fragmentation. And the functioning of the globalized economy contradicts the goal of 
sustainable development, because it leads to ecological homogenization, causes the overuse of 
resources and renders impossible the application of the precautionary principle. 
 Therefore localization is an important value. However, critics argue that re-localizing 
the economy would mean breaking the world again into small communities and we would fall 
back in an anarchical state of international relations. We must avoid this, because we certainly 
need some kind of “globalism”; that is, global governance and cooperation in order to 
preserve the global commons (Passet, 2001). The challenge of the future is to find a way 
towards more globalism with less economic globalization. 
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